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## TOP SECRET

	SUMMARY
	FAR EAST
1. S	Soviet pilots from East Germany arrive in Manchuria for combat (page
3. A	Army Attache comments on Burma's security problem (page 4).
	SOUTH ASIA
4. I	Pakistani Government maintains stability (page 4).
	NEAR EAST
7. N	Middle East Command a target of Cypriot Communists (page 6).
	WESTERN EUROPE
8 4	Austrian manufacturers deliver embargoed ball-bearings to Poland (page
9. 8	SHAPE opposes approach to Austria on military plans (page 7). Soviet harassment in Berlin viewed as move to speed shipments to East
	Germany (page 8).  Deteriorating French financial situation threatens NATO interests (page
11. I	Deteriorating French Imanetal Situation threatens 10110 meeress was
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## FAR EAST

group of 100 S	oviet jet pilots, ranging in rank
Mukden in late september. These pilots a Air Force units in East Germany and were two-month combat tour in Korea.	o lieutenant colonel, arrived in llegedly were drawn from Soviet e scheduled to return there after
The US Far Ea had been assumed on the basis of fluctuating that units were being rotated "	ast Air Force comments that "it ng tactics and markings of aircr
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	3.	Army Attache comments on Burma's security problem:
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		The US Army Attache in Rangoon believes that
25X1		Burmese Communists are capable of capturing Mandalay within forty-eight hours. He believes,
		however, that a more serious threat to the
		government is the possibility of a Communist
T.		Attack in the north coordinated with a Karen campaign in the south.
		nerability of Mandalay to Communist capture accentuates the weakness of
		government forces in north-central Burma. It also emphasizes the necessity
		of a government rapprochement with the Karens before control of upper Burma
		is entirely lost.
		SOUTH ASIA
	4.	Pakistani Government maintains stability:
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		The US Embassy in Karachi reports complete calm prevailing in Pakistan following the assassi-
		nation of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. It
		notes the absence in the press of any incitement
!		to/violence and states that an alert of the Pakistani armed services was can-
	•	celed within two days after the assassination. Finally, the Embassy remarks
		that the choices of Ghulam Mohammad and Khwaja Nazimuddin as the new
		Governor-General and Prime Minister are the best possible under the
		circumstances.
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	Comment. It appears that the Dakistani Covern
	Comment: It appears that the Pakistani Govern- ment has retained control of the situation for the time being and that there is
	little immediate danger of war either with India or Afghanistan.
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1	7.	Middle Fact Com			
T		MIGGIE East Com	mand a target of Cypriot Communists:		
I					
1			Increased Communist activity on Cyprus is de-		
			signed not only to create unrest and embarrage		
			the British but also to create the impression that		
;	,	Fact Comment I	————— Cyprus is politically unsuitable for the Middle		
1		The state of the s			
		above opinion, re	PULIS MILL LIP LOMMINIST Donty and the Market in .		
1		are both renewing	g agitation for the union of Greece and Cyprus.		
		Amonico - 111	Comment: The recent visits of British and		
1		Middle East C	V IIIISSIONS and the Egyptian nofugal to mark the control of the c		
4					
1					
		mey can gain the	support of most Cypriots and most Greeks.		
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:					
25X1			WESTERN EUROPE		
	8.	A = = = 4 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =			
1	0,	Austrian manufact	urers deliver embargoed ball-bearings to Poland:		
F					
- 3: -			The US Legation in Vienna reports that the Steyr		
100			works delivered to Poland 100, 000 dollars worth		
			of embargo-type ball-bearings during the months		
- 1			and the months		
			6		
			7		
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		25X1			

of August and September and will deliver a large quantity of such types during October. Deliveries of embargoed items constitute 50 percent of total deliveries for the first two months and far exceed the quota governing such shipments.

The Austrian Foreign Office asserts that the excessive deliveries were necessary because Western orders had absorbed Steyr capacity in non-embargo types, and the filling of Polish orders was necessary if Polish coal is to be received.

The US Legation shares the concern of the Austrian Government that Polish coal will be cut off unless Austria meets its total commitments and approves a still-pending contract involving further large shipments of embargo-type bearings.

Comment: Pending a survey of alternative sources of coal, the Austrian Government and the US Legation agreed last August that the Austrians might accept sufficient ball-bearing orders to persuade the Poles to begin coal deliveries — with the stipulation that only distant delivery dates would be authorized and that actual embargo-type deliveries would not exceed 10 percent of the total. Grave political repercussions will probably result if there is a failure of coal deliveries during the winter months.

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	The Commanding General of US Forces in Austr
	has been advised by SHAPE of its concern that a
	approach to the Austrian Government with respe
	to an Austrian military contribution in the event
_	tilities might compromise the security of Western defense plans. Any
	closure of an intention to include Austria in Western planning would provi
	USSR with a propaganda weapon on the occasion of the reconvening of the
	strian treaty deputies. Furthermore, an approach to the Austrian Govern

ment would appear to require prior Anglo-French approval on a diplomatic level.

SHADE opposes approach to Austria on military plans:

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		Comment: Vienna, under four-power occupation, does not provide sufficient safeguards for the protection of high military plans. Soviet-sponsored and Communist newspapers have already charged that
		Western occupation forces in Austria receive their commands from General Eisenhower. An approach to the Austrians now on military plans could jeopardize the change for conclusion of a state tractor, which is the properties for
		dize the chances for conclusion of a state treaty, which is the prerequisite for any substantial Austrian contribution to Western defense.
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	10	Soviet harassment in Berlin viewed as move to speed shipments to East
į	10.	Germany:
	7	TANK DE ALLEMAN CONTROL OF THE CONTR
1		American officials believe that the continued
		Soviet harassing of West Berlin is probably aimed
4		specifically at the East-West German talks
1		scheduled to begin on 23 October on iron and
i		steel deliveries. East German press and govern-
		ment circles have violently accused the West Ger-
Š		mans of delaying tactics in the current series of East-
:		West German discussions on implementing the
7		trade pact.
9		It has been suggested by US authorities that the
		23 October talks be postponed, and no agreement
		be reached with the East Germans until they actually abandon various
		harassing measures as agreed at the time of the signing of the trade pact. So far the British and French continue to show reluctance to take strong counter-
1		action.
		Comment: Twice in the past week, the USSR re-
		jected large numbers of West Berlin export permits. French and British re-
		luctance to take counter-action may arise partly from the belief that the
		effect on the Berlin economy of the various harassing measures has not been
		extremely serious, as well as from a general unwillingness at this time to
		challenge the Soviet right to control Berlin exports.
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11.	Deteriorating French financia	ıl situation	threatens	NATO	interests:
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The US Ambassador in Paris is "increasingly concerned" over the deteriorating French financial situation and over the "prevailing resentment" of French officials because of the delay

in holding US-French talks on assistance. The Ambassador proposes immediate consideration of interim assistance pending the completion of a NATO committee analysis, and urges that the proposed talks begin at once, since uncertainty on the type and extent of aid will force the French Government into actions "that may well be injurious to NATO interests."

Comment: France wants definite US commitments as a basis for defense expenditures under the 1952 budget. Because of unfavorable economic trends in France and the probability of early devaluation of the franc, it now seems increasingly unlikely that France will be able to meet its defense commitments.

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